Abstract. The theory of KdV equations allows to construct examples of physically different canonical structures for the same Hamilton operator. These examples are unproblematic in pilot wave and dynamical collapse theories, which define a physically distinguished configuration space Q, and in the Copenhagen interpretation, which identifies the canonical operators with classical descriptions of the corresponding measurements.
Introduction
In this article, we discuss some consequences of the results of an earlier article, "Why the Hamilton operator alone is not enough" [19] . The main results of that article have been two non-uniqueness theorems, which follow in a simple way from the theory of the Korteveg-de Vries (KdV) equation: For some fixed Hamilton operatorĥ, we have constructed different pairsq(s),p(s) of canonical operators, which define physically different, but equally nice representationsĥ =p(s) 2 + V (q(s), s) (we set, for simplicity, factors like 1 2m = 1). In addition, we have constructed different tensor product structures, also named "decompositions into systems" in the many worlds language, so thatĥ has an equally nice, but physically different representation of typeĥ = p i (s) 2 + V (q i (s), s) in all these tensor product structures. The point of the first article was to correct some beliefs and hopes expressed in the many worlds community, in particular:
"Essentially, the position basis gets singled out by the dynamics because the field equations of physics are local in this basis, not in any other basis." [22] ". . . the physical definition of the preferred basis derived from the structure of the unmodified Hamiltonian as suggested by environment-induced selection . . . " [18] Here our example shows that the preferred position basisq cannot be derived or singled our by the dynamics, because the equations are local in allq(s).
"I believe that the decomposition of the Universe into sensible worlds . . . is, essentially, unique." [24] Berlin, Germany.
". . . we have no reason at all to suppose that there actually are such [alternative] decompositions." [6] " [A] compelling explanation of what are the systems -how to define them given, say, the overall Hamiltonian in some suitably large Hilbert space -would be undoubtedly most useful." [26] ". . . Yet, it is far from clear how one can define systems given an overall Hilbert space of everything and the total Hamiltonian." [26] Here our example shows that the "decomposition of the universe into systems" is not uniquely defined by the Hamiltonian, thus, this hope has to be given up.
Reading in the referee report "I think no one will argue that his conclusion is incorrect, but for some of the committed many-worlds people with whom he is contending" has left me with a feeling of unease. On the one hand, it is nice to read that your conclusions are correct. On the other hand, there was a feeling that my conclusions have not been strong enough, that these examples are problematic not only for some particular opinions of some of the many worlders.
In this paper, we argue that our examples pose a serious non-uniqueness problem not only for many worlds, but for a larger class of interpretations of quantum theory, interpretations which can be classified as "pure interpretations". These interpretations may be characterized by two properties:
• First, they reject some parts of the Copenhagen interpretation, in particular those parts which define the operatorsp andq in terms of momentum and position measurements, which are described in classical terms. This may be motivated in very different ways: The definition of quantum theory should be free of classical parts, measurement theory should be derived instead of being postulated, the connection is formulated unprofessionally vague. All these are good reasons to remove this connection from the definition of quantum theory.
• Second, they do not add anything to the theory which could make a difference between the preferred canonical operatorsp andq and the otherp(s), q(s). This does not need further justification beyond Ockham's razor.
Thus, to find "pure interpretations" is a reasonable and well-motivated research program, and many different interpretations can be considered more or less as variants of pure interpretations in this sense. In particular, we have to include here the modern variants of many worlds, other Everett-like interpretations, and decoherent histories (see [25] for some overview), Mermin's Ithaca interpretation [13] , and what Wallace [25] has named "new pragmatism". But our examples pose a non-uniqueness problem for this program: Given that there are many equally nice operatorsp(s),q(s), one cannot derive the correct one based on pure quantum theory.
It is not the aim of this paper to consider all the different interpretations in detail and to evaluate if they are able to solve this non-uniqueness problem: This will be better left to proponents of the particular interpretations. In this paper, we show how this problem is solved in some interpretations, in particular, in the Copenhagen interpretation, pilot wave theories and physical collapse theories. Then we evaluate some general solution strategies. In particular, we discuss the possible role of decoherence, and argue that it should not play any role in the foundations of quantum theory. We also reject two particular "cheap" solutions: The first one, the "ignorance solution", is to leave the choice of the correctp,q to the particular quantum theory without further considerations. The other one is a "many worlds" solution which assigns independent reality to all the physically different worlds described by the differentp(s),q(s).
If one follows the arguments of this paper, the program of developing pure quantum interpretations has to be given up. One can save particular pure interpretations only by introducing an additional physically motivated structure. As a consequence, they loose one of their most attractive features -their purity. The winners are interpretations which already have a physically distinguished configuration space, namely pilot wave theories and physical collapse theories. What has been considered as a bug now appears to be an important feature: They have a physically distinguished configuration space and therefore no non-uniqueness problem.
The non-uniqueness theorems
Given the simplicity of the non-uniqueness theorems, we present here a short version of the results of [19] :
defines the initial value of some solution of the KdV equation
there exist canonical operatorsq(s),p(s), so that the representation ofĥ in terms ofq(s),p(s) is given by
. Proof. Indeed, the KdV equation is equivalent to the operator equation
for the self-adjoint operator
, as one can easily check ( [12] ). But this is analogon of the Heisenberg equation for the "Hamilton operator"â(s), applied toĥ(s), and thus defines a unitary evolution ofĥ(s). The corresponding unitary transformation is defined by
Hence, the operatorĥ(s) defined byĥ(s) = U (s)ĥ(0)U (s) −1 has the form (2) in terms of the fixed canonical operatorsp andq. Now, let us define the operatorŝ
It follows that the triple {ĥ,q(s),p(s)} is unitarily equivalent to {ĥ(s),q,p}. Thus, the representation ofĥ in terms ofq(s),p(s) is equivalent to the representation ofĥ(s) in terms ofp andq, and therefore to (2). Proof. We start with a simple degenerated two-dimensional extension of the Hamilton operator of theorem 1:
We chooseĥ as well asq x ,p x as fixed, butq y =q y (s),p y =p y (s) as depending on s. Now, we define the tensor product structure we need bŷ
In these variables, the interaction potential is already nontrivial. But it still has the same nice standard canonical form, and the resulting potential
is of comparable nice quality for different s, just as in theorem 1. The tensor product structure depends on s: If it would be the same for different s, the operatorsq 
The point of this theorem is that such a tensor product structure, also named "decomposition into systems" in many worlds, is a prerequisite for the application of decoherence. Following Zurek, it has to be postulated:
"One more axiom should [be] added to postulates (i) -(v): (o) The Universe consists of systems." [27] Given our construction, we can apply decoherence to the two different "decompositions into systems". Given that the Hamilton operator has the same standard form, with equally nice but different potentials V (q 1 ,q 2 , s), and assuming that everything is fine with the classical limit for operators of this type, we obtain two physically different classical limits for the same Hamilton operatorĥ.
That different potentials V (q, s) really define different physics seems obvious, if one looks at particular examples, such as in fig. 1 . But a safe way to see this is to consider the scattering matrix. The inverse scattering method ( [8, 1] ) for solving the KdV equation gives the following explicit result for the one-dimensional scattering matrix: One of the two coefficients of the scattering matrix, namely a(k), is an integral of motion. But the other one, the reflection coefficient b(k), depends explicitly on s. To construct an experiment which allows to measure such differences is simple (see fig. 2 ). [21] . For all these potentials,ĥ has the same spectrum, with two discrete eigenvalues. The location of the corresponding eigenstates is different. o , only the one-dimensional reflection coefficient in orthogonal direction matters. Thus, we can put the different one-dimensional potentials for different s into the mirrors, extended trivially in the other direction, for instance a localized one at the bottom, and one with two separated solitons at the right.
3.1. Canonical quantization. In particular, it is worthwhile to note that there is no problem in the canonical scheme of the definition of a quantum theory. In this scheme, the Hamilton operatorĥ is not given as an abstract operator, for example, by defining it's spectrum. Instead, we first define the canonical operatorsp,q relevant for the given quantum theory, and then define the Hamilton operator as a functionĥ =ĥ(p,q). The physical meaning of the operatorsp andq is considered to be given. Thus, the way we define a canonical quantum theory prevents the non-uniqueness problem: The particular choice of thep,q used in the definition is the preferred one.
For all practical purposes, this is clearly sufficient. In this sense, our nonuniqueness result does not have any consequences for practical applications of quantum theories, or, in other words, for the "shut up and calculate" interpretation of quantum theory. In addition, it does not have an influence on the way one has to define quantum theories -the standard way to do this is the correct one.
Pilot wave theories.
There are other interpretations where our nonuniqueness examples are unproblematic. First, there is the class of de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theories [5, 4] . In these theories, a configuration space Q has to be fixed already in the definition of the theory. The wave function, now named "pilot wave", is a function on Q, an element of the Hilbert space H ∼ = L 2 (Q, C), and considered to be a really existing function. There is also another element of reality, the configuration itself -an element q(t) ∈ Q of the configuration space. The evolution of q(t) is usually deterministic. But there are also stochastic variants. In particular, at least for the purpose of this paper, Nelson's stochastic interpretation [14] and Bell's stochastic field theory [2] can be considered as variants of pilot wave theories as well: They share the role of a particular choice of the configuration space Q as part of the definition of the theory with them.
The necessity to fix a configuration space already in the definition of the theory has been a classical argument against pilot wave theories starting with Pauli:
. . . to ascribe Ψ(x) physical reality and not to φ(p) destroys a transformation group of the theory. (Pauli to Bohm, 03 Dec 1951, [16] , 436-441, as quoted by [7] ), . . . the artificial asymmetry introduced in the treatment of the two variables of a canonically conjugated pair characterizes this form of theory as artificial metaphysics. ( [15] , as quoted by [7] ), . . . the Bohmian corpuscle picks out by fiat a preferred basis (position) . . . [6] . Now, in face of our non-uniqueness challenge, it turns out to be an advantage: Once the configuration space Q is already part of the definition of these interpretations, there appears to be no problem of choice between thep(s),q(s). The correct choice of thep(s),q(s), is the one made in the definition of the theory. The configuration space Q is physically distinguished because it describes the configuration q(t).
Dynamical collapse theories.
There is also another class of theories which do not have a problem with the non-uniqueness: Dynamical collapse theories. They realize the "is not right" possibility of Bell's famous alternative:
Either the wavefunction, as given by the Schrödinger equation, is not everything, or it is not right ( [3] p. 201).
Instead of adding a configuration, they modify the Schrödinger equation by introducing an explicit wave function collapse. See [9] for some overview. The classical example of such a theory is Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory [10] .
As a result of the collapse, the wave function becomes localized. This obviously requires that there is a choice of a configuration space Q where the particle becomes localized. Thus, we can consider the configuration space also to be part of the definition of dynamical collapse theories. But in this case, we have no nonuniqueness problem -the right choice among thep(s),q(s) is the one which is used in the definition of the theory, and it is physically distinguished by the collapse mechanism.
3.4. The Copenhagen interpretation. In addition, no non-uniqueness problem appears in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. In this interpretation, the canonical operatorsp,q play a special role: They are the operators for measurement of momentum and position. The meaning of these phrases -measurement of momentum and position -is given in classical terms, as a description of classical measurements of momentum and position. This relation between the operatorsp,q and classical measurement procedures has not been axiomatized or formalized. But not because the Copenhagen school has not been aware of the importance of these relations. Instead, these relations have been considered to be unanalysable. This point has been nicely explained in the following quote:
[Everetts] work suffers from the fundamental misunderstanding which affects all attempts at axiomatizing any part of physics. The axiomatizers do not realize that every physical theory must necessarily make use of concepts which cannot, in principle, be further analysed, since they describe the relationship between the physical system which is the object of study and the means of observation by which we study it: these concepts are those by which we give information about the experimental arrangement, enabling anyone (in principle) to repeat the experiment. It is clear that in the last resort we must here appeal to common experience as a basis for common understanding. To try (as Everett does) to include the experimental arrangement into the theoretical formalism is perfectly hopeless, since this can only shift, but never remove, this essential use of unanalysed concepts which alone makes the theory intelligible and communicable. (Leon Rosenfeld to Saul M. Bergmann, 21 Dec 1959, Rosenfeld Papers, Niels Bohr Archive, Copenhagen, as quoted by [7] ) Whatever we think about this impossibility to analyse and formalize the description of the measurement procedures -it does not change the fact that we have, in the Copenhagen interpretation, special operatorsp,q, which are associated with measurement of position and momentum. A definition of a particular quantum theory, which would not fix them, would not be complete from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation. Thus, no problem of choice between thep(s), q(s) appears -the special physical meaning ofp andq is defined by the classical measurement procedures, and the particular choice has to be made in the definition of the particular quantum theory.
Pure interpretation of quantum theory
The Copenhagen subdivision into a classical and a quantum part has been widely considered to be problematic. The ideal solution of this problem would be something which could be named a "pure interpretation":
• On the one hand, one would like to remove the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation from the definition of the theory. The whole world is quantum, and should be described by quantum theory, in terms of quantum theory, and not only some part of it.
• On the other hand, one would not like to add anything to the pure formalism of quantum theory. Quantum theory, as we have learned to use it in the "shut up and calculate" interpretation, has successfully survived the test of time, and it does not seem to require anything else.
However
This situation may be compared with the axiom about parallels in Euclidean geometry: One would like to remove this axiom from the list of axioms of Euclidean geometry, for various good reasons. Unfortunately one cannot. But it was not easy to see why. The way to prove the impossibility was the construction of different geometries which fulfill all the other axioms of Euclidean geometry.
There are also good reasons not to like the unformalized and unaxiomatized Copenhagen solution, and to hope that it may be derived from the quantum formalism alone. Unfortunately, one cannot. But it was not easy to see why, given the uncertainty of the Copenhagen interpretation. The way to prove the impossibility is the construction of physically different quantum theories which seem identical from the point of view of the pure quantum part. This is what our example shows: We have physically different quantum theories, parametrized by different canonical operatorsq(s),p(s). These theories share the whole axiomatic structure of quantum theory, they share the same abstract Hamilton operatorĥ, and this operator has the same form of a canonical Hamilton operatorĥ =p(s) 2 + V (q(s)). However vague and unsatisfactory, the Copenhagen interpretation solves this problem using it's classical part, in particular the connection ofp andq with measurement procedures described in classical terms. This solution is no longer available in a pure quantum interpretation. And it is not necessary to speculate if one can construct in some limit some classical measurement procedures which may be associated with the operatorsp,q: Whatever this construction, it could also be applied to the otherp(s),q(s), giving some other physically different but equally well-defined and well-motivated results.
This problem is a serious one:
• On the one hand, the problem cannot be simply ignored: The different possible choicesp(s),q(s), define different physics. A physical theory has to specify the physics completely. A theory which doesn't fix the nonuniqueness is simply not viable.
• On the other hand, the fact that all choices ofp(s),q(s) lead to equally nice looking operatorsĥ =p 2 + V (q), with qualitatively equally nice potentials V (q), as well as the continuous dependence on s removes all hopes to make the choice based on physical properties of the particular representationŝ h(s).
Thus, if the Copenhagen connection ofp andq with particular classical measurement procedures is no longer part of the definition, we need some other structure which allows to distinguishp andq physically, as physically preferred.
This can be summarized in the following thesis: Thesis 1. A viable interpretation of quantum theory cannot be pure: Either it has to embrace the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation, or it has to replace it by some additional structure, which is not contained in the pure quantum part of the Copenhagen interpretation.
The role of decoherence
If the Hamilton operator is of typeĥ = p 2 i + V (q i ), one can apply a very simplified version of decoherence to recover theq i given the tensor product structure: For a decomposition into system and environment of typeĥ =ĥ S +ĥ E +ĥ SE , this simplified version considers the observable which is measured byĥ SE as preferred. A consequence of this simplified version is that the decoherence-preferred observables for the Hamiltonian of our tensor products H 1s ⊗ H 2s in theorem 2 are simply the two position operatorsq This is, of course, not the real way one has to find the decoherence-preferred observables: The interaction given byĥ SE needs some time to "measure" the position, but during this time the internal Hamilton operatorĥ S does not stop to act on the state. And, once the variable measured byĥ SE is not conserved byĥ S , it cannot be measured without distortion. As a consequence, what is really "measured" by the environment is not position, but some POVM which describes wave-packets localized in position as well as momentum.
The question is if this does, in some way, make a difference for the non-uniqueness problem we consider here. Now, whatever the observable which is effectively measured by the environment, in any case it is some operator on the system H S , with H S being one of the H 1s , H 2s . Thus, these operators will also be different for different choices of s. Given the qualitatively nice form ofĥ in any of the tensor product decompositions, there is no reason why a derivation of the classical limit would fail in any other one, if it works in one decomposition. Hence, whatever the details of the classical limit procedure for a Hamilton operatorĥ =p 2 + V (q), we can expect to obtain the Hamilton function H(p, q) = p 2 + V (q) as the classical limit.
But the resulting classical Hamilton operators, with potentials V (q) as different as in the pictures of u(q) = −V (q) of figure 1, are also obviously physically different. Thus, we conclude that the details of the application of the decoherence formalism do not matter: Decoherence depends on a particular choice of a decomposition of the world into systems, and our theorem proves that there exist different tensor product decompositions which lead to different physics. Now, one could formulate this in the following thesis: Thesis 2. Decoherence does not allow the derivation of the classical limit without an additional physical structure -a special decomposition into systems -which has to be defined independently by the quantum theory. This additional structure is physically important, different choices define different physics.
In [19] , we have compared two approaches: On the one hand, to postulate a configuration space Q, on the other hand, to postulate a tensor product structure or some replacement such that decoherence allows to make the choice among thê q(s) based on this structure. We have concluded that the first way is preferable: The derivation of Q using decoherence combines the losses related with emergent structures (uncertainty, dependence on the dynamics) with those of postulated structures (lack of explanatory power) without receiving any gains. In particular, we loose the possibility to define the dynamics asĥ = ∆ + V (q) in terms of simple and natural structures defined on the configuration space.
We conclude that decoherence should not play any important role in the foundations of quantum physics. It is an important tool in various applications, and in particular allows to compute decoherence times in various situations. But these important applications share one property: The application already defines a decomposition into systems. In a situation where no such decomposition is given, as in fundamental physics, decoherence is useless.
What's wrong with the ignorance solution
Now, at a first look, there seems to be a cheap solution of the non-uniqueness problem for pure interpretations: One can simply consider the canonical structure as given by the particular quantum theory. Indeed, as we have already mentioned, for quantum theories it is obligatory to fix some canonical operators or some appropriate replacement (say, anticommuting canonical operators for fermions fields) to obtain a theory which is a meaningful quantum theory in the sense of the Copenhagen interpretation. And de facto all our quantum theories are defined in such a way. If one likes the decoherence formalism and considers decoherence as being of fundamental importance, one can also start with some tensor product structure given by the particular quantum theory. Such tensor product structures are usually available: In many particle theories each particle is viewed as an independent system (even if identical particles may be problematic). In field theory the field degrees of freedom in a single point define some continuous generalization of a tensor product structure.
So, it seems, not much has to be changed to save the pure interpretations: One has to say "this is the fundamental tensor product structure, or canonical structure, which is the physically correct one", or even more general, "the tensor product structure/the canonical structure has to be defined by the particular quantum theory", and leave everything else unchanged -a solution which may be named "ignorance solution". Now, this may be enough for a "shut up and calculate" interpretation, which, implicitly, relies on the Copenhagen interpretation or does not care at all about such questions. But the classical limit has to be derived somewhere. In particular, one has to derive the connection between the operatorsp andq and the corresponding classical measurement procedures. It doesn't matter if we leave this job to the particular quantum theory or if we have to do it for all quantum theories compatible with the particular interpretation: Either way, it has to be done. And, when we derive this classical limit, it is clearly not sufficient to make some particular choice in the definition of the particular theory. We need some special physical properties of the operatorsp andq, properties which make the application of this construction to otherp(s) andq(s) impossible. To say "the correct choice forp andq isp (0) resp.q(0), because these are the operators used in the definition" is not sufficient. It immediately raises the question "why this choice, why not another one, say, p(2.31) resp.q(2.31)?" Without our example, the answer could have been the following: "It is the special form of the representation of the Hamilton operator aŝ h =p 2 + V (q) which makesp andq special." But our example proves that this property is not sufficient to distinguish a particular choice.
To see what such a particular physical choice may look like, one can use the example of pilot wave theories: In these theories, we have the configuration q(t) ∈ Q as part of the definition of the physics. The classical limit uses, essentially, the configuration q(t), thus, cannot be applied to other choicesq(s). In physical collapse theories, the wave function becomes localized in the configuration space Q, which is physically distinguished as the space where the collapse happens. Something similar, which fixes the choice ofp,q, among thep(s),q(s), in such a way that the classical limit is inapplicable to other choicesp(s),q(s), has to be defined in every viable interpretation.
What's wrong with the many worlds solution
There is yet another way to preserve the purity despite the non-uniqueness problem. This solution could be named the "many worlds solution". It does not introduce some additional physical structure, but interprets the different canonical structures as defining different worlds, which have an independent existence. While this strategy may be especially attractive for the many worlds interpretation, whose proponents have already accepted the existence of another class of many worlds, this "many worlds solution" is, in principle, independent. One can imagine many worlds interpretations which do not accept this proposal but introduce a physical tensor product structure, as well as, say, a consistent histories interpretation which embraces this strategy without accepting many worlds in the usual sense.
This type of many worlds solution has already been proposed in the literature, in particular by Saunders [17] . Brown and Wallace describe this solution in the following way:
Suppose that there were several such decompositions, each supporting information-processing systems. Then the fact that we observe one rather than another is a fact of purely local signicance: we happen to be information-processing systems in one set of decoherent histories rather than another.
[6] Without doubt, one can assign reality to whatever one likes: Solutions with other state vectors, other Hamiltonians, or even other sets of mathematical equations, as proposed by Tegmark [23] . This may be criticized as a violation of Ockham's razor. There seems to be only one justification for applying such strategies: The invocation of the anthropic principles. These principles restrict, on the one hand, our universe to those where information-processing systems can survive. On the other hand, all the universes where we can survive are now on equal footing, and if we appear to live in some very special and simple one, we can no longer justify this based on Ockham's razor: This razor restricts only what exists. Once the other worlds exist, it can no longer be applied. Once the worlds which exist are defined by the theory, valid arguments which allow to exclude most of them, in favour of a particular, special choice, have to be anthropic, survival-related. Inside the set of existing worlds, neither Ockham's razor, nor symmetry principles can be applied.
Our universe has to be one of general position inside the subset of worlds where we can survive. Now, our case is one where the different worlds are worlds with different physics. Therefore, by considering the physics of our particular universe, and comparing it with the physics of the typical universe of ourĥ(p(s),q(s)), we can obtain physical arguments in favour or against this many worlds solution.
A case where we would be unable to find such arguments would be if the set of possible universes is small and discrete, remembering an Escher-type picture. But in our case the picture is quite a different one. In particular, we have a continuous dependence on the parameter s. Moreover, there is not only one such parameter: There are other, higher-order equations similar to the KdV equation, which commute with the KdV equation and give additional continuous parametersq(s 1 , s 2 , . . .),p(s 1 , s 2 , . . .). Taken together, they define an infinite-dimensional family of integrable systems [1] .
Comparing the different pictures in figure 1 , one can obtain an intuition about what is physically different for the differentĥ(p(s),q(s)). The pictures show a two-soliton solution. A single soliton is a solution characterized by the remarkable property that it has only a single discrete eigenstate. The two-soliton solution has already two discrete eigenstates. Their eigenvalues are integrals of motion, and hence the same in all pictures. But the location of the eigenstates in space depends on s: It corresponds approximately to the peaks of the two solitons. Now, it is clear that without a definition of the operatorq it makes no sense to talk about the localization of the eigenstates ofĥ in the configuration space Q. Our considerations have shown that this localization is physically important. Thus, the set of all potentials V (q) which can be obtained from a given Hamiltonianĥ may be characterized in a nice way: The operatorĥ defines only the spectrum, defined by the values and multiplicities of the eigenvalues. Instead, the positions of the eigenstates in the configuration space Q are missed. These positions would be different in the different worlds of the "many worlds solution". Now, already in the simplest application of quantum theory, the hydrogen atom, we use a very special potential V (q) = 1/|q − q 0 |. This choice, of course, fixes the position of the eigenstates relative to q 0 in an extremely symmetrical way. In particular, the average position of the spherially symmetrical eigenstates is exactly q 0 . This would be an unexplainable coincidence if all the other, less symmetrical, potentials would also describe existing worlds. One could hope that the situation is different in some more fundamental situation, such as in field theory. But, given the immense role of symmetry considerations in modern physics, such hopes do not seem very plausible. Thus, the many worlds solution should be rejected too.
Consequences
Once it is clear that these cheap solutions do not work, a previously pure interpretation has to add some additional structure -a preferred configuration space Q, so that H ∼ = L 2 (Q, C), or something else which allows us to derive it. Moreover, it has to give this additional structure some role in the physics, some preferred status. This is what has already been done for the configuration space in pilot wave theories and dynamical collapse theories.
Whatever the additional structure and it's justification, the previously pure interpretations are now much less attractive: Their purity is lost, and the good old argument against pilot wave and physical collapse theories -their preference for some particular choice of Q -no longer works.
In comparison with these modified pure interpretations, the Copenhagen interpretation wins: It does not have a problem with the non-uniqueness, and hence does not need to be modified. But Copenhagen does not seem to be the real winner: One of it's classical arguments against the pilot wave interpretation -that it fixes a choice of the configuration space -has lost it's power. Indeed, our example shows that Copenhagen also makes (and has to make) a choice between thep(s) andq(s). If many worlds does not survive, it will be interesting to see what the choice of those who prefer today many worlds will be: Given that one of the reasons to prefer many worlds is it's unitary evolution, they may prefer pilot wave theories, which also have unitary evolution for the wave function.
The necessity to prefer some configuration space Q physically also modifies the argumentative situation regarding relativistic symmetry. A preference for some Q violates relativistic symmetry in a quite explicit way. Replacements like a tensor product structure, which also prefer some Q via decoherence, are not better. This does not lead to any observable violations of relativistic symmetry. Nonetheless, the fundamental incompatibility between quantum theory and relativistic symmetry, quantum nonlocality, becomes more obvious, and it becomes more difficult to ignore it. In particular, this weakens another classical important argument against pilot wave and physical collapse theories: The necessity of a preferred frame.
Once the necessity to fix someq is recognized, an old argument in favour of the pilot wave approach gets new power. It has already been made by de Broglie at the Solvay conference 1927:
"It seems a little paradoxical to construct a configuration space with the coordinates of points which do not exist." [5] . The power of this argument was lost in the unitary symmetry between all observables: There was nothing special about the representation L 2 (Q, C), so one could argue that there is nothing fundamental about the configuration space. In the new situation, there is something special about it: It's operatorq is the only one among theq(s) which correctly defines the physics.
Thus, why do we need a configuration space Q to fix the physics if there exists no configuration q ∈ Q? This is a natural question, which naturally prefers all interpretations which have some special configuration q, that means, pilot wave theories in the wider sense (including stochastic versions like [2, 14] ).
Conclusions
For some fixed Hamilton operatorĥ we have constructed a set of different canonical operatorsp(s),q(s) so thatĥ, expressed in terms of thesep(s),q(s), gives equally nice but physically different operators of the canonical formĥ =p(s) 2 + V (q(s), s), with different potentials V (q, s). As a consequence, to define a quantum theory it is not sufficient to define onlyĥ, one has to define also the canonical operatorsp andq.
This observation is not problematic for existing quantum theories, which definê h as a function ofp andq. For some interpretations -such as the Copenhagen interpretation, pilot wave theories, as well as physical collapse theories -it is also unproblematic. But pure interpretations of quantum theory, which, on the one hand reject the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation, but on the other hand, do not add anything to the quantum formalism, have a serious problem: They handle all observables (except the Hamilton operator) on equal footing. But the operatorsp(s),q(s) cannot be considered as being on equal footing, because they define different physics. Such pure interpretations have to be modified: They have to fix some preferredp,q among thep(s),q(s), and to motivate this choice physically. Their probably most attractive feature -their purity -will be lost in any case.
In particular, the popular idea that decoherence can be used to fix a preferred set of observables is false. Decoherence needs a "decomposition into systems" -a tensor product structure -to work. But we have constructed different tensor product structures, giving different physics, for the same Hamilton operatorĥ as well. Thus, interpretations which rely on decoherence have to postulate some tensor product structure and to motivate this choice physically.
We have considered in more detail two possibilities to circumvent these consequences: The "ignorance solution" -to leave the choice of the canonical structure to the particular quantum theory, and to take this choice as given, without bothering about the physical meaning of this choice -does not allow a satisfactory derivation of the classical limit, where this physically unmotivated choice ofp,q should give classical measurements of momentum and position. This seems impossible if one does not rely on special physical properties of these operators.
Then there is the "many worlds solution" -one accepts all thep(s),q(s), as valid descriptions of other, equally real worlds. But in this case, our universe has to be a typical one among them, it cannot be more simple or more symmetrical, as far as this does not improve the probability of our survival. But already the simplest example of a physical Hamilton operator, the hydrogen atom with V (q) = 1/|q−q 0 |, shows much higher symmetry than the typical V (q, s) of our construction. This makes this scenario very implausible.
If, following our argumentation, the pure interpretations have to be given up or modified to incorporate some choice ofp andq, the winner will be those interpretations which already have a physically preferred configuration space: Pilot wave theories and physical collapse theories. Personally I prefer pilot wave theories: Given the beauty of the guidance equation, the essential simplification of the classical limit via the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, unitary evolution, the absence of any measurement problem, and the possibility to derive the quantum measurement axioms, relativistic symmetry seems to be the only remaining powerful argument against pilot wave interpretations. How strong is the prejudice against a preferred frame? This is hard to estimate. If it is recognized that a preferred frame, even if hidden, may lead to new discoveries, such as the condensed matter interpretation of the SM proposed in [20] , which predicts the three generations of fermions and allows the computation of the SM gauge action, the prejudice against the preferred frame may vanish into thin air.
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